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  There is no doubt that the European Union (EU) has become a global actor. The 
global or international context in which the EU has sought to define its identity, 
promote its interests and construct its policies, is increasingly seen as the stage on 
which the EU must act.1 Frank Hoffmeister indicates that, the EU has been actively 
involved in most of the significant international organizations, though many of these 
organizations have been less flexible regarding the full membership of the EU.2  
  In 2010, the European Economic Area (EEA=EU+Norway, Iceland and 
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Liechtenstein) registered tonnage came to some 209 million gross tonnage on a total 
world tonnage of 916 million gross tonnage. Overall the EEA controls 41,6% of the 
global commercial fleet measured in gross tonnage.3 The increasing effectiveness of 
the involvement of the EU in the International Maritime Organization (IMO) is a 
strategic goal of the EU.4 Even though a large volume of EU legislation on maritime 
transport (e.g. Erika I, II, III packages) has been adopted in the past decade,5 the 
EU‟s role in the IMO is still very limited. Currently, the EU is not a member of the IMO, 
neither is the EU a contracting party to most international conventions adopted under 
the auspices of the IMO (IMO Conventions), e.g. International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), International Convention for the Safety 
of Life at Sea (SOLAS) etc. The European Commission (the Commission) does 
however hold observer status in the IMO and has appointed a permanent 
representative to the IMO. Nonetheless, the Commission is not satisfied with this 
situation. For this reason, the Commission recommended to the Council of the 
European Union (the Council) in 2002 that the EU should accede to the IMO as a full 
member.6 This has received political support from the European Parliament (the 
Parliament), most notably in its Resolution on Improving Safety at Sea 
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  In our previous paper, we argue that a reinforced internal coordination process, 
rather than a full membership, may be a better and more realistic solution for the EU 
to exert its influence on international decision making processes within the IMO.8 As a 
follow-up to that paper, this paper pays further attention to the interaction between the 
EU and the IMO. Potential legal constraints of the EU‟s accession to the IMO as well 
as the IMO Conventions are analyzed. It first explores the external legal constraint. 
The questions discussed in this section are: 1) What are the requirements for the EU 
to become a full member of the IMO? 2) How can the EU persuade other Members of 
the IMO for the EU‟s accession? 3) Will the EU get an additional vote in the IMO 
decision making process or will the EU vote on behalf of its Member States? 4) What 
are the requirements for the EU to be a contracting party of IMO Conventions? If the 
EU is admitted as a contracting party of the IMO Conventions, does it aggregate the 
entire EU tonnage as far as its ratification and the entry into force of the treaty is 
concerned? The second part of the paper addresses internal legal constraint. It briefly 
describes the recent developments of the EU‟s expansion of its external competence 
towards Member States in the field of maritime transport. Then it sheds light on the 
following question: In case the EU would be a party to the IMO and IMO Conventions, 
what can a Member State do if it has an issue of vital importance which will not be 
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II 
EXTERNAL LEGAL CONSTRAINTS 
 
A. IMO Decision Making Process 
 
  The main purposes of the IMO is to provide a platform for co-operation among 
governments in the field of governmental regulation and practices relating to technical 
matters of all kinds affecting shipping engaged in international trade; to encourage 
and facilitate the general adoption of the highest practicable standards in matters 
concerning maritime safety, efficiency of navigation and prevention and control of 
marine pollution from ships.9 Originally the functions of the IMO were to be only 
„consultative and advisory‟. With the entry into force of the 1982 amendments to the 
Convention on the International Maritime Organization (IMO Convention), the IMO 
can also perform functions „assigned to it by or under international instruments 
relating to maritime matters and the effect of shipping on the marine environment‟.10 
The expression “competent international organization” in singular in the United 
Nations Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) applies exclusively to IMO, bearing in 
mind the global mandate of the Organization as a specialized agency within the 
United Nations system established by the IMO Convention.11 The formal sessions of 
negotiating committees produce debate and decisions, but the general IMO approach 
                                                             
9
 Art. 1(a), Convention on the International Maritime Organization  
10
 Art. 2(d) of the IMO Convention.  
11
 IMO LEG/MISC/6, 10 September 2008, “Implications of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea for the International Maritime Organization, a study by the Secretariat of the IMO”, 7. 
is to establish treaties by consensus.12 The IMO has improved its procedures over the 
years to ensure that changes can be introduced more quickly after the adoption of 
legally binding international instruments, mainly annexes to conventions. One of the 
most successful of these has been the process known as "tacit acceptance". It means 
that the body which adopts the amendment to an annex by a majority vote, at the 
same time fixes the entry into force and the time period within which the contracting 
parties will have the opportunity to notify their rejection of the amendment, or to 
remain silent on the subject. A decision taken by a majority will be binding for States 
that did not support the decision, unless they explicitly opt out within the time period 
foreseen. In case of silence the amendment is considered to have been accepted by 
the party.13 The procedure is so popular that it is incorporated in many important IMO 
conventions such as MARPOL and SOLAS. 
 
B. The EU’s Interaction with the IMO  
 
a. The EU’s Interaction with the IMO Convention 
 
  According to the Convention on the International Maritime Organization (IMO 
Convention), Membership in the Organization shall be open to all States.14 Therefore, 
the only means of securing accession by the EU is to amend the IMO Convention by 
inserting a clause allowing regional economic integration organizations (REIO)15 to 
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  In theory, it is possible to add a REIO clause in the IMO Convention. This was done 
by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) in 1991. The EU (at that time the 
European Community) was allowed to become a member through amending the FAO 
Constitution. However, first we must bear in mind that the EU has exclusive 
competence in this field based on the Common Fisheries Policy,17 and it has only a 
shared competence in the field of maritime transport. Moreover, legal constraints can 
be analyzed as follows.  
  The amendment of the IMO Convention shall be adopted by a two-thirds majority 
vote of the Assembly. Currently, the Assembly is made up of 169 Member States who 
generally meet once every two years.18 The EU must therefore persuade at least 113 
out of 169 States to ratify the amendment. But what are the benefits for other States in 
case of the EU‟s accession to the IMO? It is argued by Veronica Frank that the EU‟s 
participation in the IMO‟s decision-making might, in principle, discourage future EU 
regional initiatives and strengthen consistency between European and international 
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standards. Moreover, with the EU ratification, the IMO Conventions would become an 
integral part of EU law, which is equipped with strong enforcement mechanisms. This 
might ensure better compliance with IMO standards in European waters and ports.19 
Assisted by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), the Commission 
frequently issues several reasoned opinions to Member States,20 and does not 
hesitate to take Member States to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for not 
complying with EU legislative acts on maritime matters. However, it is doubtful 
whether the EU‟s accession to the IMO will eliminate the regional or unilateral action 
of the EU.  
  In 1963, the case van Gend en Loos v. Nederlands Administratie der Belastingen 
decided that the European Community constitutes a new legal order of international 
law.21 Further, the ECJ managed to separate European law from international law by 
its statement in the case Costa v. ENEL. It is declared that by contrast with ordinary 
international treaties, the EEC Treaty has created its own legal system, which on the 
entry into force of the treaty, became an integral part of the legal system of the 
Member States and which their courts are bound to apply.22 In addition, the recent 
Kadi case of the ECJ to some extent shows that the robustly pluralist approach of the 
ECJ to the relationship between EU law and international law represents a sharp 
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departure from the traditional embrace of international law by the EU.23 The relation 
between EU law and international law is still under discussion.24 Nevertheless, there 
is no doubt that the EU has both the authority and the capacity to act alone. 
  There are mainly two internal incentives for the development of the EU maritime 
safety legislation which cause “unilateralism” concern25 by the rest of the world. First, 
impatience with the IMO system has grown in Europe.26 It is believed by the EU that 
the normal framework for international action on maritime safety under the auspices of 
the IMO falls short of what was needed to tackle the causes of disasters such as the 
Erika effectively.27 The IMO is sometimes alluded to as a toothless tiger as it is not 
authorized to implement and enforce its conventions and resolutions. Moreover, it 
normally takes many years for new conventions, protocols, annexes and amendments 
to enter into force due to a double condition: a number of States and those States 
need to represent a certain level of gross tonnage in the world. Second, the main 
incentive for the adoption of the Erika I and Erika II packages is the strength of public 
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opinion following this oil tanker spill disaster. Political pressure and public opinion after 
dreadful casualties have prompted the EU to highlight the need to tighten the net in 
relation to vessel-source pollution and eliminate the discrepancies in the 
implementation of MARPOL among EU Member States.28 Furthermore, with ever 
closer integration being forged among EU Member States, supra-national institutions 
like the Commission are increasingly assuming an activist stance, seeking greater 
competence to initiate legislation for the EU.29  
  Therefore, the EU‟s membership of the IMO cannot substantially guarantee the 
elimination of unilateral or regional action of the EU, especially if an unexpected 
disaster happens in the future. After being a member of the IMO, the EU may risk 
losing some flexibility under international law since the EU may concern more about 
the international legal framework.30 But would these reasons be sufficient to convince 
other IMO members to go through the complex and very slow ratification process?31 
For the EU‟s accession to the IMO Convention, the EU seems to be overly assured of 
its economic power as a regional bloc without considering substantial benefits for 
other nations.32  
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b. The EU Interacts with the IMO Conventions   
 
  Generally speaking, most of the IMO Conventions do not allow the EU to become a 
contracting party. The only exception is the 2002 Athens Convention relating to the 
Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea, which includes a clause permitting 
the EU‟s membership. 33  The EU could become a party to most of the IMO 
Conventions by amending these conventions to insert a REIO clause first. This 
requires support by two-thirds of the Parties to the Conventions. Art.16 (d), MARPOL 
provides that amendments shall be adopted by a two-thirds majority of only the 
Parties to the Convention present and voting. Art.16(f)(i) states that an amendment to 
an article of the Convention shall be deemed to have been accepted on the date on 
which it is accepted by two thirds of the Parties, the combined merchant fleets of 
which constitute not less than 50% of the gross tonnage of the world‟s merchant fleet 
(tacit acceptance). The procedure can be more complicated if the amendment is 
considered by a Conference of Parties. The Conference of Parties can decide that the 
normal ratification process is necessary for the entry into force of the amendment and 
the “tacit acceptance” may not be applicable.34 The increasing volume of the EU 
legislation in the field no doubt strengthens the legal arguments in favor of EU 
participation in those instruments.35 It is believed that the EU is well placed to push for 
change in order to achieve a comprehensive international regulatory framework for 
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shipping, suited to face the challenges of the 21st century.36 However, once again, it 
will be a very difficult process. Assuming that the EU succeeds in inserting the REIO 
clause and is allowed to be a contracting party, two potential issues can be discussed. 
  First, the slow entry into force of IMO conventions is one of IMO‟s systemic 
deficiencies.37 On average, the process of ratifying an IMO Convention takes from 8 
to 10 years.38 As recommended by the Commission, the EU and the Member States 
should work towards a better mechanism for rapid ratification of IMO conventions at 
world level.39 The question is: will the EU aggregate the entire EU tonnage as far as 
its ratification and the coming into force of the treaty is concerned? From a legal point 
of view, the EU‟s potential contribution seems not be that substantial. Each IMO 
convention has its own conditions which have to be met for coming into force: the 
number of ratifications and the representation of world‟s gross tonnage are two main 
issues. 40  European companies own 41% of the world‟s total fleet (in dwt). 41 
Nonetheless, in case the EU becomes a contracting party of an IMO Convention 
which has not yet entered into force, e.g., International Convention for the Control and 
Management of Ships' Ballast Water and Sediments, it will play a very limited role on 
the entry into force of that Convention. This is because the EU itself does not 
represent any world‟s gross tonnage. Even nowadays the EU has become a 
supranational power and acquired competence from its Member States, in the 
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shipping world, there is no ship sailing with a single European flag. The EU failed to 
establish a common ship register in the 1990s.42 The world‟s gross tonnage is mainly 
registered in States not affiliated with the EU. Consequently, the EU‟s ratification of an 
IMO Convention may be a political incentive for other States to ratify, but it cannot 
contribute substantially to the rapid entry into force of relevant IMO Conventions. 
Moreover, ratification of the EU may not be counted in addition to the ratifications by 
the EU Member States. This was the case when the EU ratified the Ban Amendment 
to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and their Disposal in 1997.43 
  Secondly, as a contracting party of the IMO Conventions, it is reasonable for the EU 
to have a voting right within the conventions‟ framework. Subsequently, the question 
may arise as to whether the EU will have a vote in addition to that of its Member 
States. In theory, in a mixed agreement where both the EU and Member States are 
parties to the same Convention, the right to vote follows the division of powers 
between the EU and its Member States. In the Conference of Parties, the EU 
(normally represented by the Commission) votes for the EU with 27 votes in areas of 
the EU competence, the Member States keep silent. In areas of Member State 
competence, the Member States could delegate their voting power to the Presidency 
according to a common position or vote individually; the EU keeps silent.44 This is 
already well operated in other international organizations, where the EU is a full 
member.45 With its own voting right, the EU may strengthen its internal coordination 
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process and vote on behalf of 27 EU Member States. Nevertheless, for other parties 
of the IMO Convention, it will be quite hard to accept the idea that the EU will have an 
additional vote.   
 
III 
INTERNAL LEGAL CONSTRAINTS 
 
A. Recent Developments 
 
The EU competence is conferred by its Member States and further governed by the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.46 By accession to the LOSC, the EU 
declared that maritime transport, safety of shipping and the prevention of marine 
pollution are considered to be areas of shared competence between the EU and its 
Member States.47 The EU action to combat marine pollution started with a Council 
Resolution of 26 June 1978. The reduction of pollution from shipping has formed an 
integral part of the EU maritime safety policy from its beginning in 1993. 48 
Nonetheless, it was in the wake of the “Erika (1999)” and “Prestige (2002)” oil tanker 
disasters that the Commission became much more pro-active, since public opinion 
was no longer prepared to tolerate such accidents and there were calls for rigorous 
action at Community level, not least from the European Parliament and the Council of 
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Ministers.49 A series of European legislation has been enacted in the aftermath of 
“Erika” and “Prestige”. On 11 March 2009, the third maritime safety package was 
adopted by the European Parliament. This package covers legislation on flag state 
control, classification societies, port state control, vessel traffic monitoring, accident 
investigation, liability of passenger carriers and insurance.50 It is then declared by the 
Commission that the EU now has one of the world‟s most comprehensive and 
advanced regulatory frameworks for shipping. 51  According to the AETR/ERTA 
(European Road Transport Agreement) principle developed by the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ), the Community acquires external competence when it adopts internal 
common act on the same subject-matter. 52  Consequently, the EU has greatly 
expanded its external competence towards Member States in the field of maritime 
transport (prevention, control and compensation of vessels-source pollution). 
 
B. Imbalanced Application of the “Duty of Loyalty” 
 
  It is believed by the Commission that, given the EU‟s increasing powers and 
competences in the field of maritime safety, the EU participation in the IMO would 
appear justified. In particular, the Commission thinks that a stronger EU participation 
becomes necessary to prevent infringements by the Member States against their EU 
obligations and to guarantee the consistency of the EU position.53 In order to join the 
IMO and the IMO Conventions, the Commission must first be mandated by the 
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Council to negotiate with other Parties on behalf of the EU. The question is “how can 
the Commission persuade Member States to support EU‟s accession to the IMO and 
the IMO Conventions”? “Speak in one voice” would seem to be the most important 
value for Member States in the event of the EU‟s accession to the IMO and the IMO 
Conventions.54 In addition, the ECJ, through Commission v. Greece (C-45/07) [2009] 
and Commission v. Sweden (C-246/07) [2010], has judicialized the “duty of loyalty” 
(Article 4(3) Treaty on the European Union (TEU)) and greatly restricted actions of 
Member States at the international level.55 The judicialized principle of the “duty of 
loyalty” could however result in concerns for Member States. 
  It must be clear that the “duty of loyalty “applies equally for the EU institutions and 
for the Member States.56 In various pronouncements, the ECJ has held that the “duty 
of loyalty” is triggered „where it is apparent that the subject matter of an agreement or 
convention falls in part within the competence of the Community and partly within that 
of the Member States.‟ It operates „between the Member States and the Community 
institutions, both in the process of negotiation and conclusion, and in the fulfillment of 
the commitments of agreements or conventions entered into force‟, and it is „for the 
Member States and the Community institutions to take all the measures necessary so 
as best to ensure such cooperation‟.57 In the case Commission v. Greece, the ECJ 
concluded that even if there had been a failure by the Commission in its performance 
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of the duty of loyalty, this did not entitle the Member State to unilaterally adopt, on its 
own authority, corrective or protective measures designed to obviate any breach by 
an institution of rules of Community law.58 Subsequently, the question is“how long 
Member States must refrain from acting individually in order to wait for the EU‟s 
decision to act or not?” The ECJ‟s judgment is silent on this issue in the Commission v. 
Sweden. The point where the Member States are allowed to act unilaterally in the 
absence of a final EU decision remains undefined. The ECJ seems reluctant to accept 
that a failure to act within a reasonable time limit on the part of the institutions 
automatically entitles a Member State to act at the international level.59 Art. 265 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides that should the 
European institutions, in infringement of the Treaties (TFEU and TEU), fail to act, the 
Member States and other institutions of the EU may bring an action before the ECJ to 
have the infringement established. However, this action shall be admissible only if the 
EU institution concerned has first been called upon to act.60 It seems to be quite 
difficult for Member States to evoke Art.265 to force the EU institutions to act on a 
specific issue. Until now, there has been no relevant case brought to the ECJ relating 
to the application of Art. 265. Therefore, in practice, the judicialized principle of “duty 
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of loyalty” may only restrain unilateral Member States action and raises the question 
of a possible imbalance in the application of the mutual duty of loyalty.61 
  Drawing the discussion back to the EU‟s accession to the IMO and the IMO 
Conventions, the concern of Member States is: in case the EU would be a party to the 
IMO and IMO Conventions, what can Member States do if they have an issue which is 
of vital importance to them, but will not be moved on by the EU, either because of lack 
of interest, or because of opposition from other EU Member States? As sovereign 
states, currently EU Member States can at least, in theory, act in an autonomous 
manner within the IMO. Even though Member States‟ competences have been 
drastically limited by the expansion of European legislation during the past decade, 
they still have shared competences in the field of maritime transport. Member States 
are, in principle, allowed to act alone as long as the EU has not yet acted.62 It is true 
that Member States are facing infringement proceedings, e.g. Commission v. Greece, 
initiated by the Commission, as there is no clear division of the shared competence in 
the field of maritime transport. The point here is, assuming the EU accedes to the IMO 
and the IMO Conventions, any unilateral action of Member States could be easily 
identified as undermining the unity of EU‟s international representation. Therefore, 
Member States may completely lose their freedom to act alone, a position which 
would be unacceptable to Member States now and in the foreseeable future. For 
example, as stated in The Netherlands' position to the Green Paper on a Future 
Maritime Policy for the EU (2007):63 
Much has been achieved in recent years – not least through improved coordination 
and procedural arrangements – in terms of the EU‟s contribution to international 
maritime forums. That line should be continued to further strengthen the EU‟s role in 
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those forums. In the opinion of the Netherlands that should be based mainly on 
shared substantive positions and agreements on the appropriate strategy and tactics 
rather than on institutional changes such as observer status or even EU membership 
as a goal in itself.  
Such an approach would certainly be served by a more substantive and – in keeping 
with the Green Paper‟s aims – more integral balancing of interests and adoption of 
positions on the specific sectoral aspects of shipping. Substantive aims and priorities 
could form the basis for jointly deciding whether and how the EU can work as a 
catalyst for international agreement on measures considered important at European 
level. The Netherlands recognizes that EU legislation on safety and sustainability of 
shipping is increasing and for that reason does not necessarily reject the notion that 
institutional changes such as giving the Community observer status in the 
International Maritime Organization could demonstrably add value based on that 





  The EU‟s accession to the IMO and the IMO Conventions may be met with external 
and internal legal constraints, which will be difficult to resolve. Externally, the EU lacks 
persuasive reasons for convincing other IMO members to go through the complex and 
very slow ratification process of inserting an REIO clause into the IMO Convention. It 
is also difficult to get support by two-thirds of the Parties to insert an REIO clause in 
most of Conventions adopted under the auspices of IMO. Even if the EU becomes a 
contracting party to the IMO Conventions, firstly it may not be able to contribute 
substantially and additionally to the rapid entry into force of the IMO Conventions due 
to the non-existence of a European flag; secondly, in the IMO decision making 
process, it will be difficult for the EU to acquire a further vote in addition to the votes of 
each of its member states.  
  Internally, there is potentially an imbalanced application of the “duty of loyalty”. This 
is of great concern to Member States. The EU‟s accession to the IMO and the IMO 
Conventions may result in a complete loss of Member States‟ right to act alone. 
Member States will not however be equipped to deal with an issue which is of great 
importance to them, but not to the EU. Consequently, the EU‟s initiative to gain full 
membership of the IMO and the IMO Conventions may not be supported by its 
Member States.  
  In conclusion, it is suggested that the EU shall not pursue the accession to the IMO 
in the foreseeable future. 
